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Source: *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jul., 1910), pp. 18-35

Published by:

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737845>

Accessed: 15/07/2014 09:34

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SOME ASPECTS OF REFORM IN KOREA

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An Address delivered at Clark University during the Conference upon the
Far East

The program of reform inaugurated by the Japanese residency general in Korea has necessarily been an extended one. It has not confined itself to the organization of a police force of 3,000 men and gendarmery of half as many more for the purposes of the protection of property and the maintenance of peace and order; or the substituting of a division or two of Japanese troops in the peninsula for the purposes of national defence in the place of the former Korean army; but reform has gone into commerce where we see today trade being organized on a scale hitherto unknown in Korean life, both under native enterprise and with the coöperation of foreign capital from Japan, America and Europe, with the result that Korean rice is finding its way to the London market and Korean brassware, decorated mats and men's hats are being exported to America. In the world of finance we have a reliable national budget, amounting on the Korean side to yen 20,000,000, while the residency-general budget calls for 10,000,000 yen additional, making a total proposed expenditure in Korea by the government for the coming fiscal year of yen 30,000,000. We have a newly organized national treasury which handled government funds last year amounting to yen 35,000,000; a reformed currency on a gold basis, with the almost complete disappearance of the light and deceptive nickel coinage and the old copper cash; a system of government banks, ten in number, organized to lend financial aid to the people in the cultivation, drainage, irrigation and improvement of the soil, the construction and im-

provement of roads, the planting, cultivation and extension of forestry undertakings, the purchase of seeds and seedlings, agricultural implements and industrial tools, boats, vehicles and live-stock, the construction of buildings and manufactories for the pursuit of agriculture or industry—in fact, for the aid of most private undertakings which contribute to the community wealth. These banks during the first half of 1909 declared dividends ranging from 10 to 15 per cent. Reform has meant the entrance of the government itself upon important and far-reaching undertakings, including the establishment of a great printing bureau, a finely equipped national hospital, and industrial school, a model farm and agricultural school, with forestry stations in several parts of the country; a brick factory, cement works, fine art manufactory, salt kilns, and the improvement and construction of public highways, involving, so far, an initial expenditure of yen 10,000,000. In the way of railroads yen 60,000,000 has been expended, while the Japanese Diet has appropriated yen 30,000,000 to construct three more railroads—the Seoul-Gensan, the Pyeng-yang-Chinnampo and the Ho-Nam lines.

The rich mining resources of Korea have been put out to development and the government has granted 184 mining concessions to private enterprise, including mines of gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, mica, coal, graphite and mercury. Over 5,000,000 yen worth of gold was taken from Korean mines last year; 329,000 tons of coal mined during January to June, 1909, and 12,000,000 pounds of graphite secured. The program of reform has included a survey of the land and a census of the people and the nation's resources, with the result that we are to-day in possession of accurate and detailed information of the country of which formerly no one had any knowledge. In this connection it is interesting to note the following statistics on cultivated and uncultivated land in Korea.

According to the latest investigation made by the authorities, the total area of cultivated and uncultivated land in this country is as follows:

PROVINCES.	CULTIVATED SQUARE RI.	UNCULTIVATED SQUARE RI.	TOTAL SQUARE RI.
South Hamkyong.....	110	1,707	1,817
North Pyongan.....	72	1,608	1,680
Kangwon.....	47	1,621	1,668
North Kyonsang.....	165	1,058	1,233
North Hamkyong.....	968	1,066	1,134
South Pyongan.....	113	971	1,084
Whanghai.....	148	932	1,080
South Chonla.....	196	687	883
South Kyongsang.....	131	657	788
Kyongki.....	97	651	748
North Chonla.....	128	479	607
South Choongchong.....	117	433	550
North Choongchong.....	61	436	508
Total.....	1,453	12,327	13,780

The square ri is a little less than six square miles.

It will therefore be seen from this partial statement of the area covered by the measures of the new government how impossible it would be within the limits of the space at our disposal to consider the progress of reform in detail. The present paper will therefore confine itself to a short résumé of the genesis of the present reform situation, with a scanning of the principle which seems to lie at the basis of reform in Korea, the working out of this principle in the present government, and the new arrangements which have come into force during 1909.

I. THE GENESIS OF THE PRESENT REFORM SITUATION IN KOREA

National reform is not a new subject in Korea. It has been a living issue in the history of the nation ever since the negotiating of the first foreign treaties, in 1876 (Japan), and in 1883 (America). Indeed it might not be difficult to find the first promise of the coming of a new order in Korea in the retirement from power of the ex-prince regent, the Taiwon Kun, in 1873, for he was a confirmed antagonist of all change. But be that as it may, it is certain that a real beginning of reform came with the assumption of international responsibility on the part of Korea by her treaties with foreign powers,

for that new relationship imposed upon her certain fundamental modifications of her policies and changes in her governmental structure. Thus this period of attempted reform in Korea extends through thirty-three years and may be divided into six periods.

1. *The First Korean Period, 1876 to 1884.* During these years the Koreans were practically their own masters and reform was under native leadership. The king and queen were favorable to such measures, but the nobility were divided into two principal factions, one faction led by the Mins, the family of the Queen being conservatively favorable; the other faction, under the leadership of Mr. Kim Ok-kium and a few young men of kindred spirit being radical in purpose and determined to hasten matters. This radical party attempted by a coup d'état in December, 1884, to secure supreme control, but were unsuccessful. The conservative party drove the radicals into exile and placed China in a dominant position in Korean affairs.

2. *The Chinese Period, 1884-1894.* The Chinese policy in Korea consisted in exercising a restraining influence on reform, rather than acting as a factor making for it. Li Hung Chang took an active interest in peninsular affairs. Yuan Shih-kai was Li Hung Chang's representative in Seoul. On Yuan's staff were a number of young men who had been educated in America, chief among them being Tang Shao-yi now a prominent factor in Chinese affairs. In those early days these young Chinese with a western education were doubtless kept in Korea, in order to prevent them from precipitating reform in China. It is thus interesting to note that both Yuan and Tang, who thus tried their apprentice hands at political affairs in Korea, have so powerfully influenced the course of events in China during recent years. Among the results of this Chinese period were a few treaty ports opened, some new government institutions set up, the establishment of a few new modern schools, under government auspices, apparently as an experiment, the passing of the management of the Korean customs service to the control of the imperial maritime customs of China and the entrance into Korea of Christian missionaries. During this period Ameri-

can influence began to make itself felt in Korea, but was not cordially welcomed by the Chinese there. Complications in Korea led to the China-Japan war, and the termination of Chinese control in Korea.

3. *The First Japanese Period, 1894-1896.* The success of the Japanese arms in China and the terms of the Shimonoseki treaty gave Japan a controlling position in Korea, and a policy of reform, conducted by Koreans, but under the advice and direction of Count Inouye, the Japanese Minister Resident was inaugurated. This policy was defeated, however, by conditions in the peninsula itself and came to an end February 11, 1896, when the emperor fled from his palace and sought an asylum in the Russian legation in Seoul.

4. *The Russian Period, 1896-1897.* During the residence of His Majesty the Emperor in the Russian legation, Russia became naturally the directing influence in administrative affairs. Much might be said of what was attempted during this period, but it all may be summed up in the statement that nothing of a radical character was accomplished. The emperor remained in the Russian legation for about one year, when he removed to a new palace which he had constructed within the legation quarter in Seoul.

5. *The Second Korean Period, 1897-1905.* From the time the Korean emperor removed to his new palace, His Majesty was in personal control of his government, though leaning with partiality to Russian influence. Many new things were attempted and some new men among the Koreans came into prominence, but lack of potential and competent leadership led to much intrigue and factional strife, resulting in general disorder. The end came with the establishment of the Japanese protectorate, introducing Japan as the responsible guide and power in Korea.

6. *The Period of the Japanese Protectorate.* This brings our review down to the present period, with some features of which we now propose to deal. It will thus be seen that the question of national reform is no new one in Korea, but has been attempted under different auspices, usually by means of foreign guidance, but had succeeded in accomplishing little of a permanent character. It would be interesting

to inquire into the causes for the failure of these attempts in the past. The Koreans are a people of the most tractable and docile character and readily respond to all efforts honestly put forth for their betterment; why, then, should the many admirable plans and suggestions put forth have been productive of such small returns and brought only permanent disappointment, and in many instances even tragedy to those concerned? Among many others, four reasons may be set forth in explanation: (1) There was a lack of preparation of the people at large for the measures proposed. (2) The lack of competent and adequate native leadership, the prevalence of historic family feuds and antagonisms, which created jealousies and suspicions among the ruling classes, utterly destructive of the unity and coöperation necessary for success. (3) Lack of any deep and abiding conviction among either the ruling class or the common people that the old conditions and institutions were inferior, and that reformed and improved conditions were desirable. The few noble souls that really sought the reform and betterment of their nation, with pure hearts and fervent purpose, for there were such, had to work against the dead indifference, ill-concealed ridicule, and often openly manifested antagonism of the nation at large. (4) The selfishness and lack of patriotism of the ruling classes, who saw in all adequate measures for the reform of the political conditions of their nation the destruction of the age-long and despotic power which they enjoyed. It was at this point that Japan stepped in and assumed a controlling position in peninsular affairs.

The facts leading to the establishment of the Japanese protectorate in Korea in November, 1905, by which the paramount position of Japan in the peninsula was defined and received the recognition of the treaty powers, are well known. Japan thus became the legalized custodian of the power to reform the Korean administration and entered upon the task without delay. His Excellency Prince Ito, the leading statesman of Japan at the time, was entrusted with the work of reform. He brought to the task personal ability and a varied and ripened experience of the very highest order.

From his fertile brain were evolved the plans which in less than four years, amidst oppositions and antagonisms which would have daunted a less courageous and resourceful man, arrested the process of national decay, corrected abuses age-long in their standing, drove corruption to cover, and inaugurated a new day for Korea. He succeeded in introducing into the Korean administration the principles of modern and enlightened government thus laying the foundation for permanent reform. Believing that the work of foundation laying was finished, and that he could commit to other hands the work of erecting the superstructure of good government in Korea, he returned to Japan to occupy the post of president of the emperor's privy council, and to serve as president of the board of instruction for the crown prince of Korea now pursuing his studies in Japan.

In the work which he did in Korea, Prince Ito called to his assistance the finest governmental talent that Japan could offer. It is impossible to mention by name the younger men who in all departments of government have been introducing new forces and new ideals into the Korean administration, but their work will speak for itself to any unprejudiced observer, not that it has been free from mistakes, some of them of a serious character. In the meantime there has been a steady growth of interest in Japan in the success of the reform measures of the protectorate government. The nation feels that the honor of Japan is pledged to all the world to see that stable and worthy government is set up in Korea; they have rallied to the work as only a nation with the solidarity of Japan could to such a task. The reform of Korea has become the enthusiasm of Japan. Begun under Prince Ito, with the coöperation of a small group of reformers among the Koreans, the policy is being continued under his successor, the new resident general, Viscount Sone.

II. THE BASAL PRINCIPLE OF REFORM

In considering the question of Korean reform it should be borne in mind that the extent of work to be done was necessarily very great. In common with China and Japan,

Korea has possessed from ancient times an elaborate governmental system based on the time-honored models of Confucius and the Chinese sages, saturated with the spirit and animated by the ideals of primitive life. This system was so closely organized and articulated together that it was a practical impossibility to alter one part without changing the whole political economy. Japan found it so in her efforts at reform at home, and so will China. This will appear evident from the fact that the very principle underlying modern and efficient government, namely, some form of constitutionalism, is incompatible with the basis on which the Korean system rested. It is essential to the modern forms of government that official prerogative should be defined and official duties clearly expressed, but in those old forms, modeled on the ancient family organization, the idea of delimiting official prerogative and defining official duties is as repugnant as would be the proposition to an ordinary American to limit and define by a written contract the duties and powers of a father in his own family. Now one of the basal principles of reform in Korea, the line along which it has been seeking to project itself ever since reform was taken up seriously in Korea has been that of defining official prerogative and prescribing official duty in the interest of efficient government and the welfare of the people. This is the line along which the reforms now in operation have been projected, and the standard to which they must submit for judgment. It will be seen that a principle like this, once it is admitted, would have to be applied to every department of government, from the court itself to the outermost perimeter of the administrative sphere. This will indicate how vast has been the problem of reform in Korea. In fact the actual course of events has amounted to much more than mere reform. There has necessarily been a complete reconstruction of Korea's political fabric.

I shall not be expected to trace the course of a work so vast as the above through all its details, but perhaps a glance at what has been done in the application of the above principle to the court and government will suffice to indicate the work done. And may I not say here that in the necessary pointing out of the defects of the old system no condemna-

tion of the Korean people as a nation is implied, for the Koreans themselves have recognized the faults indicated and their staunchest friends have never hesitated to point them out. I yield to none in my regard and friendship for the Korean people. Many years of residence among them has proven to me conclusively that they possess many admirable traits and are capable of as great development as any nation.

III. REFORMS IN THE COURT AND GOVERNMENT

The first application of this principle of defining official prerogative and prescribing official duty in the interest of efficient government and for the welfare of the people was made in a clear differentiation of the functions of the imperial court from those of the state. Under the old system the imperial house was the government of Korea. It was not only the fountain of all honor and dignity, but the actual custodian of all power and responsibility even to the minutest matters. Every official appointed regarded himself as the personal deputy of the emperor, sharing in his power and expressing his will. With the organization of cabinet and ministerial government on modern lines there is no doubt that this old idea was never surrendered by the Korean officials, and against the central government by a cabinet of responsible ministers stood the imperial household department, still clothed by popular imagination with the vast and awesome powers of the old régime. The imperial household department was not at all backward to assume the exercise of these old powers when it wished to do so, with the result that attempts to set up an effective administration in Korea were rendered nugatory by the constant invasion of the spheres of departmental responsibility by the imperial household officials. If the household department had confined itself during the days which have intervened since Count Inouye went to Korea in 1894 to the dignified functions of national sovereignty and freely entrusted the general administration of affairs to the responsible ministers of His Majesty, the history of Korea would have been very different from what it proved in the outcome; but through the con-

fusing of the functions of court with those of the state, and the insistence of a personal rather than a responsible government, confusion of the worst sort resulted, attended by official corruption and widespread disorder among the people. The invasion of the different provinces of administration developed the household department into a huge governmental executive with multiplied bureaus and an official staff more in number than all the other departments of state combined. These officials, free from all restraint of their power except the personal displeasure of his Majesty, which they always sooner or later incurred, perverted their large powers and privileges for private ends; sales of office, bribes and confiscations of private property were of common occurrence. Speaking of this condition and its evil character, Mr. Homer B. Hulbert says:

Public offices were bought and sold like any other goods. There was a regular schedule of the price of offices, ranging from fifty thousand dollars for a provincial governorship to five hundred dollars for a small magistrate's position. The handsome returns which this brought in to the venal officials at Seoul fed their cupidity and in order to increase their felonious profits the tenure of office was shortened so as to make the payment of their enormous fees more frequent. Of course this was a direct tax upon the people, for each governor or prefect was obliged to tax people heavily in order to cover the price of office and to feather his own nest during his short tenure of that office. The central government would not interfere with the fleecing policy of a prefect so long as he paid into the treasury the regular amount of taxation together with any other special taxes that the government may lay upon the people. In return for this non-interference in the prefect's little game, the government only demanded that if the prefect goes beyond the limit of the people's endurance, and they rise up and kill him or drive him from the place, neither he nor his family will trouble the government to reinstate him or obtain redress of any kind. It has come about, therefore, that the ability of a prefect is measured by the skill he shows in gauging the patience of the people and keeping the finger on the public pulse, like the inquisitors, in order to judge when the torture has reached a point where the endurance of the victim is exhausted. Why should the central government interfere in the man's behalf? The sooner he is driven from his place the sooner someone else will be found to pay for the office again.

The result was an impairment of imperial prestige, a perversion of the imperial prerogative through the betrayal of

the imperial confidence, and a derogation of the imperial dignity.

To-day this confusion of function has been rectified. The household department has been retired from administrative affairs and compelled to confine itself to those measures which have to do with the dignity, comfort and safety of the sovereign, and to abstain from any participation in executive and administrative government. To achieve this, five things have been done: (1) The minister of the imperial household has been restrained from addressing the throne except on matters relating to the imperial house. (2) The numerous bureaus of the old organization have been reduced from 24 to 13. (3) The immense staff of household officials, numbering several thousand, have been reduced by two-thirds. (4) The properties of the state and the imperial house having become confused during the past period of disorganization, a commission on investigation of imperial and state property has been appointed to examine into the condition of all such property, define respective ownership and settle all questions of mutual adjustment. (5) The succession to the throne has by imperial decree been invested in the younger brother of the present emperor, and this young prince, now 14 years old, is in Japan pursuing his studies under the direction of a board of instruction of which His Excellency Prince Ito was the first head.

Turning now to the efforts to reform the government itself, it is not possible to enter fully upon the conditions which had grown up under the ancient organization. The central government consisted of a deliberative council of state (the *Wi-jung-pu*), with little more than advisory powers, while throughout the country were magistrates over the counties and governors over the provinces. Each magistrate exercised the combined functions of prefect and mayor, judge of the law court, collector and treasurer of the government revenues, and commander of the local military and police forces. In estimating what has been done we find that the number of officials in the central government at Seoul was reduced through a process of amalgamation of departments and a redistribution of official function from 751 to

571. It will be seen from this that there was a gain on the fiscal side at least. In place of the council of state, a cabinet was instituted consisting of a prime minister and ministers of home affairs, finance, education, war, justice, and agriculture, commerce and public works. The functions and responsibilities of these departments of state were clearly differentiated. At first the entire personnel of the government was Korean, the staff of the Japanese residency acting in an advisory capacity. In accordance with the Japan-Korea agreement of July 24, 1907, Japanese became eligible for posts under the Korean government, and Japanese were appointed to the posts of vice ministers in the various departments of state. Their duty is to assist the minister of state, take charge of departmental affairs, and supervise all business of the department. Further provision was also made for the employment of Japanese as heads of bureaus and secretaries in all the various departments and in the provinces, so that to-day a large staff of Japanese governmental experts are serving in the Korean government in responsible posts.

Three years ago a commission was appointed, consisting of Koreans and Japanese, acting under Prince Ito, to investigate the condition of provincial and local administration and suggest remedies for the evils discovered. That there was need of some immediate and radical measure is indicated by a report made public by the ministry of finance on Korea a few days ago, that investigation has revealed the fact that during the years 1895-1907, the amount of public funds misappropriated by provincial officials was yen 3,000,000, and now consternation reigns among the old officary because of a demand from the government that these funds be made good or else the guilty ones must suffer. Some 3,000 persons are involved. Those who will promise to make good are given eight years in which to do it. Already yen 300,000, or one-tenth of the amount peculated, has been recovered by the government. At the present time the territorial government consists of 13 provinces, 11 prefectures and 333 districts, administered by Korean officials. Associated with them is, in each province, a staff of Japanese officials consisting of a secretary with the powers of lieutenant governor, a chief police

inspector and three clerks. A small beginning has been made towards a species of local autonomy in that the governor and the magistrates may issue administrative decrees, and the people are being encouraged to engage more and more in affairs that properly belong to local government, such as education and building, and it is provided that magistrates for the districts in a province should be taken from the men of that province instead of taking all magistrates from the Seoul nobility.

From the above organization of the government of Korea it will be seen that there is no provision in the Korean cabinet for foreign affairs. The relations of Korea and foreign nations came into the sole control of Japan by the establishment of the protectorate and they are managed by a bureau in the residency-general, the staff of which consists of officials from the department of foreign affairs in Tokio. This function of government is exercised for Korea by Japan, with whom all foreigners in Korea have their relations. That the foreign relations of Korea are not small may be gathered from the fact that there are resident in Korea the following nationalities:

FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN KOREA

According to the latest investigation made by the police affairs bureau of the home office, the total number of the Chinese, Americans, English, Germans and French residing in this country is as follows:

PROFESSION	CHIN.	AMER.	ENG.	GERM.	FRENCH.
Official.....	63	9	10	7	5
Missionaries.....	21	182	66	1	38
Commerce.....	2,420	17	5	9	12
Industry.....	412	4	..	5	1
Agriculture.....	513	3
Mining.....	...	313	10	..	4
Miscellaneous.....	3,276	73	61	8	21
Total	6,705	318	152	30	84

Besides these, there are three Belgians (official), five Norwegians (mining), ten Russians (official), eleven Greeks (merchants), and four Italians (three official and one miner.)

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The most recent development in the reform of Korea occurred in connection with the retirement of Prince Ito from the post of resident general, in which he was succeeded by His Excellency Viscount Sone, who has served in Korea as deputy resident general and is in full touch and sympathy with the policies and principles of Prince Ito. This new development was threefold in its character, consisting in the abolition of the Korean ministry of war, the establishment of a Korean organ of finance in the newly created Central Bank of Korea, and the transfer of legal and judicial functions of government from Korean to Japanese control. This has resulted in a further modification of the Korean cabinet, the ministers of war and justice disappearing, so that at present the Korean cabinet consists of a prime minister and ministers of state for home affairs, finance, education and agriculture, commerce and public works, five in all.

a. Abolition of the Korean Ministry of War

In considering these three most recent developments of governmental reform in Korea, it may be said that the abolition of the ministry of war was foreshadowed in the disbanding of the Korean army in August, 1907. At that time the army numbered about 9,000 men, maintained at a cost of yen 1,500,000 to the public revenue. On the disbandment of this force a battalion of Life Guards was organized, and these guards, numbering 44 officers, 644 infantry and 91 lancers, with a military school for the training of officers, constituted the entire war establishment, over which the minister of war presided. This establishment, with the exception of the military school, has been retained, but has been combined with the imperial household department as the guards office of the department, military affairs in Korea now being entirely under the Japanese ministry of war.

b. Establishment of a Korean Organ of Finance

Until recently the Dai Ichi Ginko, the First Bank of Japan, which was the private bank of Baron Shibusawa, recently

in America as the honored leader of the delegation of Japanese business men visiting this country, was the government's central organ of finance. This bank has now surrendered its functions to a new bank, organized by the government of Korea and known as the Central Bank of Korea. According to the ordinance granting its charter, it is to have a capital of 10,000,000 yen, of which 3,000,000 will be subscribed by the Korean government, and 7,000,000 will be offered to the Korean, Japanese and Chinese public, shareholders being limited to these nationalities. The shares held by the government will not be entitled to dividends until at least six per cent is paid on all shares held by the public. During the first five years of its existence six per cent is guaranteed to the non-official shareholders. As royalty, the government is entitled to one half of all the bank's profits above 12 per cent on its capital. For purposes of business, the Korean government is to lend the bank 1,500,000 yen without interest, this money to be unredeemed for five years after which it will be paid back in ten annual installments. The president's term of office is five years, and Dr. Ichihara, former Manager of the Dai Ichi Ginko, has been chosen for the post. He will be assisted by three directors serving for three years and two managing directors serving for two years.

c. Transfer of Legal and Judicial Function

A further development in the program of reform has come about through a new agreement with Korea, negotiated July 12, 1909, by reason of which Japan assumes full control of the courts and judiciary in Korea. The text of this agreement is as follows:

MEMORANDUM.

The governments of Japan and Korea, with a view to improve the administration of justice and prisons in Korea, thereby assuring protection for persons and property of Korean subjects, as well as the subjects and citizens of

foreign Powers in Korea, and also to consolidate the basis of the Korean finance, have agreed upon the following stipulations:

ARTICLE I.

Until the systems of justice and prisons in Korea shall have been recognized as complete, the government of Korea delegates to the government of Japan the administration of justice and prisons.

ARTICLE II.

The government of Japan shall appoint the officers of the Japanese courts and prisons in Korea from among Japanese and Korean subjects having the necessary qualifications for the posts.

ARTICLE III.

The Japanese courts in Korea shall apply Korean laws to Korean subjects, except in cases specially provided for in agreements or in laws and ordinances.

ARTICLE IV.

The Korean local authorities and public functionaries shall, according to their respective functions, submit to the control and direction of the Japanese competent authorities in Korea, and render assistance to those authorities, in respect of the administration of justice and prisons.

ARTICLE V.

The government of Japan shall bear all expenses connected with the administration of justice and prisons in Korea.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed and sealed and exchanged the present memorandum, drawn up in duplicate, both in the Japanese and Korean languages.

VISCOUNT SONE ARASUKE, *Resident General*.

12th day of the 7th month of the 42d year of Meiji.

YE WAN-YONG, *Minister President of State*.

12th day of the 7th month of the 3d year of Ryuki.

This agreement will come into force Nov. 1st, 1909.

Commenting on this agreement, the *Japan Mail* calls attention to the fact that the powers delegated to Japan are not to be permanently exercised; not in name at all

events. A limit is set, namely, "until the systems of justice and prisons in Korea shall have been recognized as complete." Such a restriction may evidently be merely nominal. The judge of Korean completeness being Japan, and Japan alone, it may very well be that a favorable judgment will be deferred to a very distant future. That, however, is a matter of good faith, and having always showed herself faithful in the discharge of her international engagements, we have no right to doubt Japan's sincerity now. Besides, she will have a substantial reason for desiring to divest herself of those duties as soon as possible. She is to bear all expenses connected with the administration of justice and prisons in Korea, and as that will constitute a not inconsiderable burden, we may assume that she will not needlessly postpone the pleasure of being relieved of it. An important point elucidated by the memorandum is that Korean subjects will be eligible for seats on the bench and posts in the management of the prisons. The number of those who will be called to the higher posts will necessarily be small, at least for the present.

We find the third article somewhat ambiguous. It provides clearly enough that Japanese courts in Korea—and it may be noted, *en passant*, that the courts are called "Japanese"—shall apply Korean laws to Korean subjects, but nothing is said as to the laws that are to be applied in cases of mixed nationality. Presumably the residential tribunals will be abolished, and cases hitherto coming before them will be tried by the new "Japanese courts." What laws will then be applied? Doubtless these *lacunæ* will be filled up by subsequent regulations which do not properly find a place in the Memorandum.

This measure means a substantial diminution of Korea's sovereignty. There is no concealing the fact, nor is there, so far as we can see, any disposition to conceal it. But Japan evidently feels that whatever route leads most directly and most speedily to the blessing of security of life and property under good laws honestly administered, that route it is obviously Japan's duty to take. She has made herself responsible for Korea's welfare and progress.

Thus the situation stands to-day. The principles of reform and the policies necessary to make them effective have been clearly laid down, but it is evident that several years must pass before the permanent results of these reforms will be evident. That these measures are acceptable to the Korean people at large cannot be claimed. Bitterness, deep-seated and almost universal, is felt by the masses, who deeply resent the loss of national autonomy. This bitterness has manifested itself in a state of chronic insurrection since 1905 and in a number of assassinations and attempts at assassination, culminating in the death of Prince Ito at Harbin, at the hands of a young Korean named An. The greatest problem confronting Japan is that of winning the confidence and support of the masses of the Korean people to the measures inaugurated in her name in the Peninsula.